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Abstract 
PL supplier disclosure is becoming increasingly significant in recent years. Thanks to 
the Internet, consumers can easily know the supplier identity of their favorite PLs trough 
consumer forums, web pages, etc. Furthermore, some retailers use the disclosure as a 
strategy to differentiate from its competitors, even sometimes showing NB's logo on PL 
packaging. Drawing on signaling theory, the objective of this thesis is to address the 
implications of PL supplier disclosure, which can be divided into three minor objectives: 
effects on NB perceptions, effects on PL perceptions and effects on the retailer perceptions. 
The results obtained from subsequent experiments using student and consumer samples 
on food product categories, suggest PL supplier disclosure affects consumer perceptions 
about NBs, PLs and retailers. And more importantly, brand and retailer image play a major 
role in determining the PL supplier disclosure effects. In the first place, due to supplier 
disclosure, the perceived quality, image and loyalty intention of a higher image NB will be 
affected negatively if supplies a high image PL. These effects will disappear for a lower 
image NB, but the NB will be perceived as more expensive. Secondly, consumers will 
perceive the image of the retailer as higher if it starts from a low image positioning. 
Moreover, if the NB has a high image, then a retailer with a lower image positioning will 
be perceived as more expensive. Finally, considering the PL tier, when a high image NB 
supplies a premium PL, the NB’s quality and image will improve, increasing the NB-
premium PL differentials. In contrast, if the PL features a standard positioning, NB-PL 
differentials will be lower. 
This thesis contributes to previous PL supplier disclosure literature in several ways. 
First, it sets light on the lack of consensus about the effects of supplier revelation on NB 
perceptions. Second, it expands PL supplier disclosure knowledge from standard PLs to 
premium PLs. Third, it explores the effects of disclosing a dual supplier on retailer’s 
perceptions, a research gap that, to the best of our knowledge, only one author has studied 
previously. Finally, no previous literature has studied the moderating effects of brand image 
positioning. Moreover, the results obtained in this thesis have important implications for 
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Resumen 
La revelación del fabricante de marca de distribuidor (MD) es más significativa en los 
últimos años. Gracias a Internet, los consumidores pueden conocer fácilmente la identidad 
del proveedor de sus MD favoritas a través de foros de consumidores, páginas web, etc. 
Además, algunos minoristas utilizan la revelación como una estrategia para diferenciarse 
de sus competidores, incluso a veces mostrando el logotipo de la marca de fabricante (MF) 
en los envases de la MD. Basándose en la teoría de señales, el objetivo de esta tesis es 
examinar las implicaciones de la revelación del fabricante de MD, dividiéndolo en tres 
objetivos menores: efectos en las percepciones de MF, efectos en las percepciones de MD 
y efectos en las percepciones de los minoristas. 
Los resultados obtenidos en subsiguientes experimentos utilizando muestras de 
estudiantes y consumidores en categorías de alimentos, sugieren que la revelación del 
proveedor de MD afecta las percepciones de los consumidores sobre las MF, MD y 
minoristas. Y más importante, la imagen de marca y el minorista son muy relevantes en la 
determinación de los efectos de revelación del fabricante de MD. En primer lugar, la calidad 
percibida, la imagen y la intención de lealtad hacia una MF de alta imagen se verán 
afectadas negativamente si fabrica una MD de alta imagen. Estos efectos desaparecerán 
para una MF de menor imagen, que se percibirá como más cara. Segundo, los consumidores 
percibirán la imagen del minorista como más alta si parte de un posicionamiento en imagen 
bajo. Además, si la MF tiene una alta imagen, un minorista con un posicionamiento de 
imagen más bajo será percibido como más caro. Finalmente, considerando el tipo de MD, 
si una MF de alta imagen fabrica una MD premium, la calidad y la imagen de la MF 
mejorarán, aumentando los diferenciales de MF-MD premium. Por el contrario, si la MD 
presenta un posicionamiento estándar, los diferenciales MF-MD serán menores. 
Esta tesis contribuye a la literatura previa de revelación del fabricante de MD arrojando 
luz a la falta de consenso sobre los efectos de la revelación de los fabricantes en las 
percepciones de la MF. Segundo, amplía el conocimiento de revelación de fabricantes de 
MD estándar a MD premium. Tercero, explora los efectos de revelar un fabricante dual en 
las percepciones del minorista, algo que, hasta donde sabemos, solo un autor ha estudiado 
previamente. Finalmente, la literatura previa no ha estudiado los efectos moderadores del 
posicionamiento de la imagen de marca. Además, los resultados obtenidos en esta tesis 
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1.1. Private label market 
The Private Label Manufacturers Association (PLMA) defines private label products as 
“all merchandise sold under a retailer's brand. That brand can be the retailer's own name or 
a name created exclusively by that retailer. In some cases, a retailer may belong to a 
wholesale group that owns the brands that are available to only the members of the group” 
(PLMA, 2019b). The traditional concept of private label has evolved from being follower 
products imitating the leading national brands, sold exclusively under one retailer, who 
makes all the marketing investments with a generalist focus and mainly produced by a 
specialized external supplier, to be seen as innovator products (with a focus in specialized 
lines), sold through different retailers (mainly for internationalization strategy), supported 
by brand-focus or category-focus marketing campaigns and whose production is starting to 
be subject of vertical integration by retailers (Dekimpe & Geyskens, 2019). Nowadays, we 
can find PL products in virtually all food and non-food categories: fresh, frozen or canned 
food, pet care, health care and beauty, non-prescription drugs, hardware, stationery and 
clothing, among others (PLMA, 2020). 
Regarding the PL market, the growth of PLs continue increasing from year to year more 
than NBs. In 2019 PLs accounted a 34.9% value share in Western Europe and 18.5% in 
United States (IRI, 2019a, 2019b; Kantar, 2019; Nielsen, 2019b; PLMA, 2019a). 
Moreover, PL share is generally greater in more developed countries than in emerging 
markets (Nielsen, 2018). We can divide the PL market in four differentiated regions 
according to their characteristics. Europe, especially the western part, hosts most of the 
largest PL markets (Nielsen, 2018). In more developed European countries where the PL 
penetration is high, there is a deceleration in standard and economy PLs growth (Nielsen, 
2019a). In North America, particularly United States, PL penetration is still relatively low, 
giving some room for growth (Nielsen, 2018). In this market, consumers are now more 
willing to pay an extra price or the same price for a PL than for a branded product, and 
premium PLs are growing faster than standard and premium PLs (Nielsen, 2019a). 
Consumers in Latin America are not very prone to buy PLs. However, due to the delicate 
economic situation, some Latinos can look for value in these brands. Finally, Asia-Pacific 
consumers are more brand loyal. Therefore, PL share is significantly low compared to the 
global average (Nielsen, 2018). 
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Focusing on PLs, in recent years these brands have managed to convince the Spanish 
consumer of their value for money, which has led to greater acceptance and growth at the 
national level. By categories, the penetration in value of PL in the Spanish market stands 
out in the drugstore (47.7%), followed by dry feeding (40.7%), especially in the most basic 
sections. In other categories such as beauty or drinks, the consumer has a more brand-based 
preference, and only allocates 20% of its budget to PLs (ARAL, 2019). 
Loyalty to PLs in Spain has been reinforced in recent years, mainly thanks to 
Mercadona, the leading retailer in the distribution sector. Mercadona accounts for almost 
the half of the Spanish' PL share in 2018. This retailer is really committed to its PLs, and 
consumers have them in high regard because of the price-quality ratio (ARAL, 2019). There 
are also other large retail chains that lately are focusing on their PL, as Lidl or Dia. 
Moreover, the aforementioned retailers, along with Carrefour and Eroski, have added to 
their portfolios premium PLs (ARAL, 2019).   
Within PLs, retailers nowadays can offer different types of brands in the price-quality 
spectrum. In the bottom of the spectrum we find the economy PLs. These brands are usually 
sold in commodity categories, where they offer a low price-quality option, so they mainly 
attract more price conscious consumers. Due to its low price, the retailer obtains very 
limited profit margins and also, economy PLs often cannibalize the sales of standard PLs 
(Geyskens et al., 2010; Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007; Martos-Partal et al., 2015). Standard 
PLs feature a good value for money alternative for consumers, since retailers promote them  
Figure 1.1. Example of PL tiers 
 
Source: prepared by the authors 
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as having the same quality than leading brands in the category but at lower prices. Standard 
PLs are the most purchased type of PL, whose profit margins are acceptable for the retailer. 
These brands usually follow a copycat strategy targeted on NBs. To do this, retailers use 
reverse engineering and technology similar to that of the brand leader (Burt, 2000; 
Geyskens et al., 2010; Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007; Sinapuelas and Robinson, 2009; ter 
Braak et al., 2013a). Finally, on the top of the spectrum we can find the premium PLs. 
These high-quality and high-priced brands can compete directly with leading NBs, since in 
some cases premium PLs' quality and price can be higher than NBs'. Therefore, these 
brands represent a key element in the retailer differentiation, giving them a unique badge 
with the highest possible profit margin among all types of PL. Thus, retailers should make 
great investments to achieve these premium brands (Geysken et al., 2010; Keller et al., 
2016; Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007; Nenycz-Thiel and Romaniuk, 2016; ter Braak et al., 
2013a, 2014). 
Looking to market insights by PL type, premium PLs are undoubtedly leading the 
general PL growth. Consumers are now more prone to buy PLs instead of NBs. And this 
change of mind is led by the premiumization of retailer's own brands. For example, 
premium PLs now represent over 19% of sales in the US (Deloitte, 2020; Nielsen, 2019a). 
Standard PL is still the tier that accounts for the majority of retailer’s own labels sales, 
although the growth is lower than for premium PL’s (The Grocer, 2020). Finally, according 
to Nielsen data (2019a), economy PLs’ sales have decreased in recent years. However, 
these brands remain as a fightback against hard discounters (The Grocer, 2020). 
1.2. Dual manufacturing strategy  
According to PLMA (2019b), there are three types of PL manufacturers: 
- manufacturers specialized mainly in producing PLs 
- major retailers or chains of retailers that have their own factories to produce PLs for 
their stores, and 
- manufacturers that produce their own manufacturer brands, but also supply PLs for 
one or more retailers 
When we talk about dual manufacturers, we refer to this last case, that is, the 
manufacturer that produces its own NBs but also manufactures PLs. As examples of dual 
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manufacturers, we can find Bausch & Lomb, Bird’s Eye, Del Monte, Nestlé, Heinz, among 
others (Amaldoss and Shin, 2015). 
From the manufacturer’s perspective, dual manufacturing strategy can be beneficial for 
NB manufacturers in several ways. This strategy allows dual manufacturers to take 
advantage of scale and scope economies, absorbing excess capacity, as long as NB 
production is not compromised, which can drive to higher margins due to PL’s sales. This 
is particularly important for secondary NB manufacturers. Supplying PLs can compensate 
their lower NB’s sales and brand strength (Bergès and Bouamra-Mechemache, 2011; Chen 
et al., 2010; Dunne and Narasimhan, 1999; Hoch, 1996; Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007; 
Mills, 1999; Nasser et al., 2013; Quelch and Harding, 1996; Verhoef et al., 2002). Yet, 
manufacturers should be aware of a possible cannibalization of NB’s sales led by producing 
PLs (Amaldoss and Shin, 2015; Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007; Quelch and Harding, 1996).  
Sometimes, supplying PLs might be more viable than introducing a secondary-fighter 
brand against PLs (Nasser et al., 2013). For example, when the quality of the NB relative 
to PL is too high, or too low, the retailer may find it more profitable to delist the NB (Bergès 
and Bouamra-Mechemache, 2011). By supplying PLs, manufactures can also improve the 
relationship with the retailer, which might lead to a greater shelf presence for the NBs in 
the retailer’s stores (Dunne and Narasimhan, 1999; ter Braak et al., 2013a,b). Moreover, 
manufacturers can benefit from channel and promotion coordination (Dunne and 
Narasimhan, 1999; Kumar et al., 2010) by setting the quality and wholesale price of PLs 
and using it to better differentiate their NBs (Narasimhan, 1999; ter Braak et al., 2013b). 
This is important because a higher quality gap between PLs and NBs will lead consumers 
to be more willing to pay a price premium for NBs (Steenkamp et al., 2010). In addition, 
dual manufacturers can use premium PLs as a way to experiment with innovations at lower 
costs and without the risk of a failed new product introductions impacting on their NBs 
(Dunne and Narasimhan, 1999). 
On the other hand, retailers can benefit with dual manufacturing strategy in terms of an 
increase of their bargaining power with respect the manufacturer, which lead to lower PL’s 
production costs and enhanced quality for PLs and greater freedom to set PLs’ and NBs’ 
prices (Amaldoss and Shin, 2015; Bergès and Bouamra-Mechemache, 2011). However, 
using a dual supplier carries a PLs’ wholesale prices increase, which may be transferred to 
the final consumer (Chen et al., 2010) and can decrease PLs’ sales. This dual manufacturer-
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retailer relationship, in the long run, will lead to lower margins for the retailer (ter Braak et 
al., 2013b). Nevertheless, dual manufacturers are beneficial to retailers in terms of category 
and new product insights, especially appealing to use as premium PL suppliers or for 
retailers more focused on quality (Hoch, 1996; Kumar et al., 2010; ter Braak et al., 2013b).  
The dual branding strategy used to be a well-kept secret where nearly the 50% of US 
NB manufacturers also made PLs for retailers (Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007; Quelch and 
Harding, 1996). However, nowadays, when they go shopping, consumers can know who 
really is the manufacturer behind the PL. For example, in Korea it is a legal requirement 
for retailers to disclose who is the manufacturer of their PLs in the packaging (Cho et al., 
2015). And in Spain, Mercadona, the leader in the retail market, since 2012 reveals all the 
manufacturers of its PLs. Even in some cases the NB logo appears on the PL packaging 
(Mercadona, 2013, 2018). Moreover, thanks to the internet, consumers also can know who 
is the manufacturer a PL by reading consumer reports, comments in forums, social 
networks, etc. 
Figure 1.2. Examples of supplier disclosure on PL packaging in Spain 
 
Source: prepared by the authors 
The disclosure of a manufacturer as a PL supplier, that is, as a dual manufacturer, has 
some advantages and disadvantages for manufacturers and retailers related to brand equity 
that complement the operational ones presented earlier. If consumers notice that a dual 
manufacturer is supplying PLs for a specific retailer, manufacturer NB's brand equity could 
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be damaged. In this sense, consumers' quality perceptions and image about NB could be 
harmed, losing the justification for the price premium under NBs are usually sold, and even 
allowing cannibalization of NB´s sales (Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007; Pérez-Santamaría et 
al., 2019; Steenkamp et al., 2010, Quelch and Harding, 1996). On the other hand, retailers 
can obtain better quality and image perceptions for their PLs as a consequence of 
perceptions transfer and new products and innovations for their premium PLs (Cho et al., 
2015; Dunne and Narasimhan, 1999; Fugate, 1986; Rahman and Soesilo, 2018; Olson, 
2012; Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal, 2000). 
1.3. Objectives and contribution of the thesis 
As previous stated, PLs continue to experience greater growth than NBs, mainly due to 
demand in emerging markets, and the trend of premiumisation (Kantar, 2019; Nielsen, 
2018, 2019a). On the other hand, it is becoming easier for consumers to be aware of the PL 
supplier (Cho et al, 2015; Mercadona, 2013, 2018). Therefore, a deeper investigation of the 
consequences of the dual manufacturing strategy for both manufacturers and retailers is 
necessary, not only in terms of cost/benefit, but also on consumer brand equity, since it 
influences profitability (Crass et al., 2019). 
Previous literature on PL supplier disclosure is scarce, which underscores a research 
gap. Cho et al. (2015) and Fugate (1986) have studied the effects of revealing the PL 
supplier only on PLs, showing a positive effect. Regarding NBs, some authors have 
addressed the supplier disclosure, but found different results. Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal 
(2000) found a positive effect for PLs but there was a non-significant decrease in NBs 
perceptions. However, Olson (2012) and Rahaman and Soesilo (2018), apart from positive 
effects on PLs, also found negative effects of PL supplier disclosure on NBs perceptions. 
Therefore, there is a lack of consensus regarding the effects of PL supplier disclosure on 
NBs and this thesis tries to set light about the implications of disclosing that a retailer is 
following a dual manufacturing strategy on NB perceptions.  
On the other hand, despite the great importance that PLs’ perceptions have on the retailer 
(Ailawadi and Keller, 2004; Collins-Dodd and Lindley, 2003; Delgado-Ballester et al., 
2014; Dolbec and Chebat, 2013; Grewal et al, 1998), and the influence of PL supplier 
disclosure on PLs perceptions (Cho et al., 2015; Fugate, 1986; Olson, 2012; Rahaman and 
Soesilo, 2018; Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal, 2000), only Olson (2012) studied PL supplier 
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disclosure on retailer’s perceptions. Thus, the present thesis tries to further investigate this 
missing gap on previous literature.  
In addition, all these studies analyze standard PLs. However, it is the premium PLs that 
are giving a strong boost to the PL growth (IRI, 2018a, 2018b). These brands, characterized 
by their high quality, but also for their higher price and seeking for retailer differentiation 
(Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007; ter Braak et al., 2013b), have not been considered in 
previous research on the revelation of the PL supplier. This thesis aims to advance into this 
line of research, analyzing the effects of the revelation of the supplier of premium PLs both 
on the PL itself and on the NB. 
Finally, none of the aforementioned studies concerning the PL supplier disclosure have 
considered the image positioning of all the agents involved, both the images of the brands 
(NBs and PLs) and the retailer's image. We believe that depending on whether the image 
positioning is high or low, the effects of the disclosure of the PL supplier may be different. 
It is the main objective of this thesis to analyze the possible moderating effects that may 
have the image of the agents involved.  
Table 1.1. Objectives specified by chapters 
 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 
PL supplier disclosure on NB ✔  ✔ 
PL supplier disclosure on PL   ✔ 
PL supplier disclosure on retailer  ✔  
Moderating effect of NB's image ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Moderating effect of PL's image ✔   
Moderating effect of PL tier   ✔ 
Moderating effect of retailer's image  ✔  
 
1.4. Structure of the thesis 
The present thesis is structured as follows: 
 Chapter 2 analyzes the effects of PL supplier disclosure on the perceptions of the NB 
owned by the dual manufacturer and the moderation of these effects by the image of 
both the NB and the PL. 
PRIVATE LABEL SUPPLIER DISCLOSURE: IMPLICATIONS FOR MANUFACTURERS, RETAILERS AND CONSUMERS 
10 
 Chapter 3 addresses the effects of disclosing the supplier of the PL on the consumers’ 
perceptions about the retailer. Also, the possible moderating effects of NB’s image and 
retailer’s image positioning are studied. 
 Chapter 4 investigates PL supplier disclosure considering the retailer’s PL portfolio, 
that is, standard and premium PLs. Implications for NBs’ and PLs’ perceptions are 
presented, noting the moderation of NB’s image and PL tier. 
 Finally, Chapter 5 discusses the conclusions and implications for theory and practice 
derived from the studies conducted in this thesis. 
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Private labels have become central to retail strategies, with increasingly sophisticated 
approaches. The price and quality differentials that traditionally distinguished these store 
brands from NBs are diminishing (Steenkamp et al., 2010), and many retailers develop 
extended PL portfolios with distinct value propositions (Geyskens et al., 2010). In response, 
NB manufacturers must account for PLs in their strategic decisions (Gómez and Rubio-
Benito, 2008; Hoch, 1996; Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007; Verhoef et al., 2002), whether by 
waiting, doing nothing, increasing their distinction from the PLs (e.g., improving quality, 
innovations), reducing price differentials, or introducing additional brands. Another option 
is to supply PLs, and in this development, two types of PL manufacturers have emerged: 
those that specialize in PLs and dual manufacturers that produce both PLs and NBs. In the 
United States, an estimated half of all NB manufacturers follow such a dual strategy, and 
this option appears particularly appealing in markets that feature strong PL penetration 
(Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007).  
By supplying PLs, dual manufacturers can take advantage of their excess production 
capacity, guarantee a broader presence of their own brands on retail shelves, and pursue 
innovations at reduced costs by experimenting with premium PLs (ter Braak et al., 2013b). 
But such options also might lead to a loss of brand equity for dual manufacturers, which 
could harm perceptions of the quality of, and their ability to charge higher prices for their 
NB. In addition, a cannibalization effect might arise between the NB and PL produced by 
the same manufacturer (Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007). 
Rather than studying the strategic decision to function as a dual manufacturer, prior 
academic research tends to focus on consumer (De Chernatory, 1989; Steenkamp et al., 
2010; Szymanowski and Gijsbrechts, 2012) or retailer (Chung and Lee, 2017; ter Braak et 
al., 2013a) perspectives on PLs. The manufacturer’s perspective is less widely addressed 
(cf. Gómez and Rubio-Benito, 2008; ter Braak et al., 2013b; Verhoef et al., 2002). Yet this 
perspective is pertinent, especially as more manufacturers start to supply PLs, and this 
practice becomes more familiar. Therefore, this study adopts a manufacturer perspective 
analyzing the effect on NB equity of dual manufacturer and we focus on consumer 
perceptual measures of brand equity because brand equity resides in the hearts and minds 
of consumers (Datta et al., 2017). 
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In the practice consumers could know the identity of PL supplier. For example, Korea 
legally mandates that packaging discloses the name of the PL manufacturer (Cho et al., 
2015), and in Spain, Mercadona discloses all its PL manufacturers on its packaging 
(Mercadona, 2012). Moreover, PLs and NBs are next to each other on the retailer's shelves 
(Fernandez-Nogales and Gómez-Suárez, 2005) which allows brand comparison (Hoch, 
1996; Steenkamp and Kumar 2007). Also, consumers carefully read the labels of the PLs 
and NBs (Perrigo Company Study, 1995) and buy both NBs and PLs when they go 
shopping (Ailawadi et al., 2008).  
This study presents PL supply by a dual manufacturer, which is disclosed on the PL 
packaging, as a form of brand extension. Most extensions tend to be analyzed in relation to 
NBs, rather than PLs, but the peculiarities of these two types of brands require some 
separate consideration (Olson, 2012b). That is, PLs sell exclusively through a specific 
retailer, usually with many categories, and consumers often suffer greater uncertainty in 
their evaluations of PLs (Erdem et al., 2004; Richardson et al., 1994). Furthermore, even if 
PL associations and perceptions reside in memory proximal to those of NBs, consumers 
also regard PLs as a whole as a distinct subcategory (Nenycz-Thiel et al., 2010). Thus, 
research pertaining to NB contexts might not apply to PLs, and the image transfers between 
PLs and NBs have been scarcely researched (Fugate, 1986; Olson, 2012a; Vaidyanathan 
and Aggarwal, 2000). 
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This study therefore analyzes the effect of disclosing suppliers on PL packaging on the 
perceived quality, brand image, loyalty intention, and relative price of the NBs produced 
by dual manufacturers, with careful consideration of possible moderating effects of the 
images of both the NB and PL. Figure 2.1 contains the conceptual framework.  
2.2. Theoretical framework 
Fugate (1986) analyzes altered perceptions of PL attributes according to the identity of 
their manufacturer and finds effects of stimulus intensity and knowledge of the 
manufacturer. However, these results pertain to evaluations of the PL, not the NB. 
Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal (2000) study a NB–PL alliance to determine if it might 
enhance PL perceptions without damaging NB evaluations. They find that quality 
perceptions and attitudes toward a PL with NB ingredients improve, and the NB is not 
affected negatively. Olson (2012a) goes a step further to assess the impacts of consumers’ 
awareness of the existence of a common supplier or shared product specifications. The 
results indicate that credible information about a NB supplier of a PL harms perceptions of 
the uniqueness of the product and affective and conative attitudes toward the NB. These 
results thus suggest the possible existence of moderating effects and the need for a deeper 
investigation of this conceptual context with empirical evidence. In addition, some of these 
contributions are relatively old, and the PL market continues to evolve, indicating the need 
for an update. 
2.2.1. Brand equity: perceived quality, brand image, loyalty intention and relative 
price 
Aaker (1991, p. 15) defines brand equity as "a set of brand assets and liabilities to a 
brand, its name and symbol, that add to or subtract from the value provided by a product or 
service to a firm and/or to that firm's customers.” It thus should be measured as a 
multidimensional construct, comprising brand awareness, perceived quality, brand 
associations, brand loyalty, and other exclusive brand assets. Keller (2003, p. 60) refers to 
consumer-based brand equity as "the differential effect that brand knowledge has on 
consumer response to the marketing of that brand.” A brand enjoys positive customer-based 
brand equity if consumers react more favorably to a product when the brand is evident than 
when it is not. Keller (1993) asserts that this brand equity stems from brand knowledge and 
should be measured as brand awareness and brand image. Both these definitions come from 
cognitive psychology; a complementary approach instead adopts an information economy 
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perspective and explicitly considers the asymmetry and imperfection of information in 
markets, such that brand equity is the value the brand signal provides in the market. In this 
view, brand equity is associated with high quality products, but brand equity is achieved 
through the credibility of the quality signal, regardless of the brand’s actual quality 
positioning. In addition, this theory specifies loyalty as a result, not an antecedent, of brand 
equity (Erdem and Swait, 1998; Erdem et al., 2006). 
This study prioritizes the most common dimensions of brand equity: perceived quality, 
perceived image, and loyalty intention (Çifci et al., 2016; Yoo et al., 2000). Perceived 
quality reflects overall consumer evaluations of the superiority of a product (Zeithaml, 
1988). Brands that evoke greater perceived quality also achieve more brand equity (Yoo et 
al., 2000). Brand image, as a type of brand association, refers to the associations linked to 
the brand that the consumer holds in memory (Keller, 1993). If consumers associate a 
particular brand with a high image, the brand will attain greater brand equity (Verhoef, et 
al., 2007; Yoo et al., 2000). That high brand image will be achieved when consumers 
perceive that brand as strong, attractive, unique and desirable. Whereas a brand is perceived 
with lower image when is less strong, less attractive, less unique and less desirable (Vogel 
et al., 2008). Finally, loyalty intention is a consequence of brand equity, because brands 
with more equity increase consumer utility and motivate them to buy the same brand 
repeatedly (Erdem and Swait, 1998; Yoo et al., 2000). 
Brand equity also has an effect on companies’ performance and thus can be measured 
from this perspective (Ailawadi et al., 2003; Datta et al., 2017), according to product market 
performance (e.g., price, market share) or financial performance (e.g., income, cash flows). 
That is, the benefits of strong brand equity should be reflected in brand performance, and a 
widely used measure of product market performance is relative price, which influences 
brand credibility and thus its equity (Erdem et al., 2006). A price premium indicates the 
brand’s ability to charge a higher price for a product (Ailawadi et al., 2003). This price 
differential usually is measured by asking consumers how much more they would be 
willing to pay for a product marked by a brand, versus an unbranded option (Aaker, 1991; 
Ailawadi et al., 2003). However, Erdem et al. (2006) calculate prices relative to all other 
competitors in a category, which offers two important advantages: it facilitates 
comparisons, and it establishes the same comparison frame for all brands in the category 
(i.e., including both NB and PL and their price differentials). A simple price differential 
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requires a comparison with an unbranded product (which are difficult to find in frequently 
purchased product categories) or with a single type of PL (which is difficult because 
modern PLs adopt varying price positioning strategies). Therefore, this study investigates 
price, relative to the rest of the market alternatives, to measure brand equity from a market 
perspective. 
2.2.2. Private label image and retailer positioning 
Whereas PLs traditionally offered inferior quality alternatives, offset by low prices 
(Richardson et al., 1994; Sethuraman and Gielens, 2014), today retailers offer PLs with 
quality comparable or even superior to NBs (Geyskens et al., 2010), in an expanded PL 
portfolio strategy. In particular, many retailers are taking a three-tiered, “good, better, best” 
approach, with an economy PL that seeks to attract the most price-sensitive consumers, a 
standard PL positioned as a good value for money, and a premium PL that provides high 
quality and allows the retailer to differentiate itself from competitors or improve its image 
(Geyskens et al., 2010; Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007; Martos-Partal et al., 2015).  
Even for these three tiers though, PLs can vary in their brand equity, credibility, 
reputation, and price/quality positioning, similar to NBs (Erdem et al., 2004; González-
Benito and Martos-Partal, 2012). In particular, the retailer's price positioning largely 
determines the PLs available through its stores (González-Benito and Martos-Partal, 2012; 
Koschate-Fischer et al., 2014), and because these PLs only sell through that retailer, their 
image depends on the retailer's effort to create a strong, credible, reputable brand. That is, 
the PL image affects the retailer image, and vice versa (Nies and Natter, 2012). Retailers 
that position themselves on price likely transfer a price image to their PLs, and vice versa. 
As they gain experience with and build a reputation for PLs, the higher PL image also 
should prompt stronger price associations than are available for retailers that position 
themselves less on price. 
2.2.3. Influence of context and image transfers between NB and PL 
Human judgments depend on the context. Many irrelevant factors, such as time, people’s 
moods, or the presence of other products, thus can influence consumer evaluations (Chien 
et al., 2010). Two conflicting effects on product evaluations emerge from the context (Bless 
and Schwarz, 2010; Lee and Suk, 2010). An assimilation effect arises if the evaluation of 
the object is in line with the context; a contrast effect occurs if the evaluation conflicts with 
the context. Assimilation effects are common when the context activates concepts that can 
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help consumers interpret the quality of a product. Accordingly, consumer decisions in 
context depend on the references and brands that form a comparison category (Nam and 
Sternthal, 2008). 
However, because of their unique attributes, consumers might regard PLs as a separate 
category, distinct from NBs (Nenycz-Thiel et al., 2010). If a NB manufacturer decides to 
supply a standard PL, it likely represents a vertical (downward) extension, in price/quality 
terms, which affects both brands involved. Specifically, the current study seeks to 
determine the effect that supplying the PL has on the NB when the manufacturer is 
disclosed by the PL, such that the retailer encourages the comparison of the PL and the NB.  
Following the principles of information theory, Palmeira and Thomas (2011) argue that 
a consumer who considers two brands by the same company seeks differences between 
(i.e., compares) them, to give meaning to their co-presence. Consumers also use various 
signals to infer the quality of a product and reduce perceived risk (Richardson et al., 1994). 
Because PLs create more evaluation uncertainty than NBs (Erdem et al., 2004; Richardson 
et al., 1994), signals might be even more important for them, and the disclosure of the 
manufacturer may provide a clear signal that affects perceptions and purchase decisions. In 
turn, being disclosed with the PL might carry risks for the NB manufacturer. For example, 
failed extensions can damage the parent brand image due to feedback effects (Riley et al., 
2013), and even successful extensions can suffer negative effects due to brand dilution or 
cannibalization (Carter and Curry, 2013).  
To reduce the failure potential of an extension, most research suggests the need for 
perceived fit between the original brand and new extension (Pina et al., 2013). Such fit 
might result from consistent brand concepts or similar product characteristics (Park et al., 
1991). When a dual manufacturer engages in an extension by supplying a PL, it likely 
attains good fit in terms of product similarity, because it is manufacturing products in the 
same category, but not in terms of consistency in the brand concept, because brands and 
their equity are key to distinguishing PLs and NBs. Instead, supplying the PL may reduce 
the perceived quality gap between PLs and NBs, which could lower the price differential 
between them (Steenkamp et al., 2010).  
Simonin and Ruth (1998) also offer evidence that NB brand images are harmed by 
associations with PL "twins." Heath et al. (2011) delve into potentially asymmetric effects 
CHAPTER 2 
25 
of brand extensions and find that extensions to lower quality levels produce effects for the 
parent brand that range from negative to neutral. In line with this evidence, for the case of 
a NB manufacturer that supplies a PL, the effects on consumers evaluations of the NB 
should range from negative to neutral. Olson (2012a) affirms this prediction, by showing 
that credible information that a leading manufacturer supplies a PL decreases perceptions 
of the uniqueness of the product, as well as affective and conative attitudes, leading to a 
diminished NB image. 
Regarding the effect on brand loyalty, Carter and Curry (2013) identify a negative 
relationship between parent brand quality and the sales of its extension when high 
functional fit exists. A leading NB manufacturer supplying the PL thus might cause 
consumers to prefer the PL, because its price–quality relationship will be better than that 
of the NB. 
That is, a NB that evokes a higher brand image and reputation likely prompts negative 
contrast effects on perceptions of its quality, brand image, and loyalty intention when it 
supplies a PL. Such contrast effects might not arise for NBs with lower images. These 
brands are secondary in consumers’ considerations (Nenycz-Thiel et al., 2010), with 
weaker associations as unique products. They also tend to feature lower prices than leading 
NBs. Because the fit of the extension to a PL would be better, supplying the PL may be less 
harmful to NB manufacturers with lower brand images. 
Finally, images transfer the retailer and its PLs, so retailers that focus on prices should 
transfer that image of more advantageous prices to their PLs, and vice versa (Nies and 
Natter, 2012). These stronger price associations might prevent a sense of fit with a NB 
manufacturer supplying the PLs. Retailers with less experience or reputation related to PLs 
instead offer weak price associations, so the contrast will be less evident, with reduced 
negative effects on the manufacturer. In accordance with these combined arguments, the 
following hypotheses predict outcomes related to perceived quality, brand image, and 
loyalty intention. 
H1: Disclosing a dual manufacturer with a high image NB as a supplier of a PL affects 
the NB's perceived quality more negatively if the PL has a high image on price; these 
effects are weaker if the NB has a lower image. 
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H2: Disclosing a dual manufacturer with a high image NB as a supplier of a PL affects 
the NB's image more negatively if the PL has a high image on price; these effects are 
weaker if the NB has a lower image. 
H3: Disclosing a dual manufacturer with a high image NB as a supplier of a PL affects 
loyalty to the NB more negatively if the PL has a high image on price; these effects are 
weaker if the NB has a lower image. 
Furthermore, a manufacturer supplying a PL may influence the market performance of 
the NB. The contrast effect should be greatest for dual manufacturers with lower image 
NBs that manufacture high image PL positioned on price. In this case, consumers can 
recognize the advantageous price associations of the PL with respect to the NB, such that 
the resulting information processing likely will create a contrast effect in perceptions of the 
price of the NB and the PL. The resulting contextualization of the NB identifies it as more 
expensive, to make sense of the extension strategy. 
H4: Disclosing a dual manufacturer with a low image NB as a supplier of a PL affects the 
NB's relative price perception more negatively if the PL has a higher image on price; 
these effects are weaker if the NB has a high image. 
2.3. Methodology 
2.3.1. Experimental design 
To gather empirical evidence to test the hypotheses, this study relies on an experiment 
with students from a Spanish university. A pretest confirmed the comprehensibility of the 
questionnaire items and scales, as well as the suitability of the data collection technique. 
The respondents completed the questionnaire in April 2016. The survey spanned one 
product category, bottled mineral water, which is well-known and accessible to university 
students. In a second phase, to ensure the generalizability of the results, we collect data for 
Spanish consumers. Respondents reported to be responsible for or actively involved in 
purchasing food for their households. We ensured that the data came from a wide range of 
ages and both genders, using a quota sampling method. The respondents completed the 
questionnaire between September and October 2018. The focal product category in the 
consumer sample is milk chocolate tablets. Therefore, we use categories which should 
differ in their degree of hedonism and PL penetration.  
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The study design used a between-subjects experiment with a 2 (high versus low PL 
image) × 2 (high versus low NB image) factorial design for each category. In the control 
condition, participants saw a picture of the brand to be evaluated. In the experimental 
conditions, they saw an image of the NB to evaluate, an image of the PL, and the 
manufacturing labels of both brands (the label are representative of a real water or chocolate 
label). Each participant was randomly assigned to one of the control or experimental 
conditions, with controls to ensure similar sample sizes across treatments. Respondents 
assessed only one product category, so the categories do not constitute an additional 
experimental condition; the use of two different categories instead served to enhance the 
validity of the study. The water versions feature the NBs FontVella (high brand image) and 
Fuensanta (low brand image) and two PLs, Hacendado (Mercadona, high image) and Guía 
(E. Leclerc, low image). The chocolate versions feature Nestlé (high image) and Trapa (low 
image) and Hacendado (high image, Mercadona) and Ifa Eliges (Gadis, low image). The 
PLs are presented as standard PLs; the products are fictitious. For an example treatment, 
see Appendix 1.1 and Appendix 1.2. 
In terms of pricing strategies Mercadona uses an everyday low pricing (EDLP) strategy, 
with an ingrained price position for which the reputation of its PL is central task. It has sold 
PLs since 1996 (Mercadona, 2017). The other two retailers (E.Leclerc and Gadis) all use a 
high-low price strategy. These retailers also have less of a PL tradition. 
2.3.2. Sample and measures 
Data were collected from 540 participants, 228 who reviewed waters and 312 who 
considered chocolate tablets. After eliminating incomplete questionnaires, 517 valid 
questionnaires remained (217 for water, 300 for chocolate), as detailed in Table 2.1. 
Women represent 51.4% water and 71% chocolate of the total sample, and the average age 
of the respondents is water M = 21.13, SD = 2.04 and chocolate M = 47.10, SD = 16.47. 
The measures of brand familiarity, perceived brand quality, relative price perception, 
brand image, and brand loyalty toward the brand all use 7-point Likert scales obtained from 
prior literature (see Table 2.2). For brand familiarity, the item comes from Richardson et 
al. (1996) and asks respondents if they know X brand. Both brand quality and relative price  
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Table 2.1. Sample size  
Category Control Cases Experimental Conditions Total 
Water      217 
       High Image PL Low Image PL  
  High Image NB 28 High Image NB 27 27  
  Low Image NB 28 Low Image NB 26 26  
  High Image PL 28      
  Low Image PL 27      
Chocolate        300 
       High Image PL Low Image PL  
  High Image NB 30 High Image NB 45 45  
  Low Image NB 30 Low Image NB 45 45  
  High Image PL 30      
  Low Image PL 30      
Total  231  286 517 
perceptions involve items from Erdem et al. (2006): "The quality of brand X is very high" and 
"Compared with other brands, brand X is more expensive." Brand image and brand loyalty intention 
are multi-item constructs; independent principal component analyses guarantee their content 
validity and the unidemensionality of the scales. In addition, all Cronbach’s alpha values are greater 
than .7, indicating the reliability of the scales. 
Mean analyses of the control conditions are presented in Table 2.3. Respondents are more 
familiar with the high image NBs (p < .01). These NBs evoke perceptions of higher quality, more 
loyalty intention, and higher price points than NBs with low images (p < .01) in water category. In 
chocolate category the results are consistent with water results for quality and loyalty intention (p 
< .01), but there are no differences in relative price between the two NBs. 
Table 2.2. Items descriptions and principal components analysis  
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Notes: M = mean, SD = standard deviation, α = Cronbach’s alpha, COR = Pearson correlation with p < .01. 
Data in brackets correspond to chocolate, the rest to water. 
Table 2.3. Mean tests  
Between brands 
  Familiarity Quality Image Loyalty RP 
NB High Image (FontVella) 6.79
 5.57 0.82 0.55 5.5 
Low Image (Fuensanta) 5.24*** 4.14*** -0.70*** -0.46*** 3.75*** 
PL High Image (Hacendado)  4.68
 0.69 0.70 2.32 
Low Image (Guía)  3.48*** -0.52*** -0.62*** 2.85** 
  Familiarity Quality Image Loyalty RP 
NB High Image (Nestlé) 6.83
 5.93 0.38 0.21 4.87 
Low Image (Trapa) 6.47** 5.30** -0.71*** -0.46*** 4.70 
PL High Image (Hacendado)  5.37
 0.39 0.39 3.17 
Low Image (Ifa Eliges)  4.80** -0.18** -0.04** 4.17*** 








Water Mercadona E.Leclerc 
Chocolate Mercadona Gadis 
Notes: Image and loyalty are represented by their factor means. RP = relative price. 
 **p < .05, ***p < .01. 
Regarding the water PLs, the high image version prompts perceptions of higher quality 
and a higher degree of loyalty intention than the PL with the low brand image (p < .01). 
The results confirm that the high image PL is perceived as cheaper than the low image PL 
(p < .05). For chocolate, the high image PL has a better image, quality and loyalty intention 
(p < .05) and appears significantly cheaper than the PL with low brand image (p < .01). 
This study also includes several control measures. First, the time each respondent took 
to answer the questionnaire was measured in minutes; water M = 5.82, SD = 2.32; chocolate 
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M = 4.24, SD = 1.63. This measure indicates whether participants paid similar attention to 
the stimuli. Second, a separate item asked about their attention to the labels in the 
questionnaires, "I like to be informed by reading the labels of the products" (water M = 
4.46, SD = 1.65; chocolate M = 5.51, SD = 1.96). 
2.4. Analysis and results 
The following linear regression models support the hypotheses tests: 
𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 × IDj + 𝜀𝜀,          (1) 
𝐼𝐼𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼j + 𝜀𝜀,          (2) 
𝐿𝐿𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼j + 𝜀𝜀, and             (3) 
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑄𝑖𝑖 =  𝛼𝛼 + 𝛽𝛽 × 𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼j + 𝜀𝜀,          (4) 
where i indicates the NBs; j represents the PLs; QNB, INB, LNB, and RPNB refer to the 
quality, brand image, loyalty intention, and relative price perception of the NB; α is a 
constant to estimate the model; β is the parameter to be estimated, namely, the effect of 
disclosing the NB supplier of the PL; and ID represents the supplier disclosure, such that it 
equals 1 if the supplier is disclosed, as in the experimental conditions, and 0 for the control 
condition.  
Table 2.4 presents estimations of four models, one for each dependent variable for each 
combination of cases i (high and low image NB) and j (high and low image PL) and each 
category. In the water category, the effect of a dual manufacturer with a high image NB is 
negative and significant only if it supplies a high image PL for a retailer with a price 
positioning (e.g., FontVella makes Hacendado). However, if this manufacturer supplies low 
image PLs the effect is not significant. For chocolate, we find the same results. In support 
of H1, the effect on the perceived quality of the low image NB is weaker than that for the 
high image NB, especially when the PL has a high image on price. That is, the effects of 
the supplier's disclosure on the NB range from negative to neutral for high image NB and 
from positive to neutral for low image NB. 
These results signal a contrast effect, such that the participants assign a greater perceived 
quality penalty to high image NBs that manufacture high image PLs positioned on price. 
The image inconsistency between the NB and the PL then causes more damage to the NB, 
because the PL generates consideration of a subcategory characterized by lower quality and  
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Table 2.4. Model estimations 
 Quality Image Loyalty Relative Price 
 β t β t β t β t 
 WATER 
 High Image NB 
Constant 5.57*** 33.64 0.82*** 6.57 0.55*** 3.09 5.50*** 28.16 
PL high 
image -0.28++ -2.10 -0.29++ -2.17 -0.24++ -1.82 -0.10 -0.73 
Constant 5.57*** 32.67 0.82*** 7.12 0.55*** 3.05 5.50*** 26.82 
PL low 
image 0.03 0.24 -0.13 -0.97 -0.13 -0.92 -0.16 -1.20 
 Low Image NB 
Constant 4.14 19.17 -0.70*** -4.61 -0.46** -2.58 3.75*** 20.36 
PL high 
image 0.11 0.79 0.05 0.38 0.10 0.71 0.32++ 2.39 
Constant 4.14*** 18.85 -0.70*** -4.52 -0.46** -2.53 3.750*** 20.52 
PL low 
image 0.04 0.29 0.05 0.33 0.12 0.90 0.05 0.37 
 CHOCOLATE 
 High Image NB 
Constant 5.93*** 30.47 0.39** 2.60 0.21 1.24 4.87*** 20.77 
PL high 
image -0.18++ -1.59 -0.19++ -1.62 -0.20++ -1.69 0.05 -0.44 
Constant 5.93*** 24.37 0.38** 2.47 0.21 0.96 4.87*** 18.45 
PL low 
image 0.41 0.35 0.02 0.15 -0.07 -0.64 0.05 0.46 
 Low Image NB 
Constant 5.30*** 23.22 -0.71*** -3.43 -0.46*** -2.68 4.70*** 18.49 
PL high 
image 0.19++ 1.62 0.23++ 2.05 0.32+++ 2.92 0.01 0.03 
Constant 5.30*** 22.31 -0.71*** -3.69 -0.46** -2.59 4.70*** 18.53 
PL low 
image 0.16+ 1.34 0.29+++ 2.48 0.28+++ 2.48 -0.30+++ -2.68 
Notes: This table contains the standardized coefficients of the disclosure variable. β = coefficient, t = t-value  
*p < .10, **p < .05, ***p < .01 (two-tailed test); +p < .10, ++p < .05, +++p < .01 (one-tailed test). 
price, so the lower quality notions get associated with the NB. In other cases, a weaker 
effect occurs because no negative results appear. These results maintain in both product 
categories. Thus, H1 is supported.  
The results are similar for brand image, in support of H2. The influence on the image of 
the NB with a lower image is weaker; this effect is negative when the PL has a high image 
on price. Disclosing the manufacturer as the supplier for a PL with a high image on price 
negatively affects a high image NB, with its unique associations. The resulting contrast 
effect causes consumers to penalize the NB, which loses its positive associations and comes 
to seem less unique. In other cases, the negative effects disappear. The gap between high 
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image NBs and low image PLs cause consumers to find no similarities and perceive the 
products as different, even though the manufacturer is the same, so no contrast effect arises. 
This pattern of results again is repeated with regard to loyalty intention, disclosing the 
manufacturer as the supplier for a PL with a high image on price negatively affects high 
image NB loyalty, consumers will prefer to buy the PL because it offers the same product 
but with a better value for money which translates into a drop in the loyalty of the NB; then 
H3 is also supported. 
Finally, the results for H4 show that the disclosure of a low image NB as the 
manufacturer of a high image PL has the most positive, significant effect on perceptions of 
the NB’s relative price in water category. Such that the NB is perceived as more expensive 
within the category due to the unique associations of the PL with an advantageous price 
(and comparable quality). The positive effect on low image NB’s relative price dissipates 
when the PL has a lower image. These results are lined to H4 for water category, however, 
in chocolate category we get different results. Low image NB’s relative price are perceived 
as cheaper when supplies low image PL. In both categories, when the NB has a higher 
image, no effects appear regardless of the image of the PL. Therefore, the results partially 
support H4. The lack of positive effect in chocolate category might be due to the no 
significant differences between the relative price of high and low NB, as we show in Table 
2.3.  
Some complementary analyses test whether the differences between the two product 
categories might stem from other explanations. In particular, there are no differences in the 
populations assigned to the control and experimental conditions in term of age or sex. With 
regard to attention devoted to the different categories or the control or experimental 
conditions, the control variables indicate in all cases that respondents paid similar attention 
to the labels, with significant variations across categories or control and experimental 
conditions.  
2.5. Discussion 
Dual manufacturers adopt PL manufacturing operations as a strategic alternative or to 
stay in the market. In a retail context in which retailers have increased power, retailers 
might force the manufacturer to disclose itself on PL packages, to benefit from image 
transfers from the NB to the PL. Therefore, it is critical to specify the effects of this 
disclosure on brand equity. This study’s results confirm that supplying a standard PL does 
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not necessarily involve a negative effect on the brand equity of the NB, though the influence 
is moderated by NB image and PL image. Supplying a PL can have negative effects, in 
terms of a loss of perceived quality, image, and loyalty intention for the NB, if the dual 
manufacturer sells a high image NB and manufactures a standard, high image PL positioned 
on price. No such effect emerges when the manufacturer’s NB suffers a low image. In the 
latter case though, manufacturing the PL could affect the relative price of the NB, which 
will seem more expensive, especially when the retailer’s PL has a high image on price.  
2.5.1. Theoretical implications 
This paper contributes to brand extension literature and affirms Heath et al.’s (2011) 
assertion that extensions to lower quality levels in the same category produce effects on 
evaluations of the parent brand that go from negative to neutral. This study extends those 
findings to the case of a dual manufacturer, disclosed on the PL packaging. Whereas Heath 
et al. (2011) analyze an extension of a brand that belongs to the same company, the current 
study identifies these effects for an extended brand that does not represent the same 
company but rather is a PL, owned by a retailer and not the manufacturer. In addition, also 
in line with Heath et al. (2011), we find effects from neutral to positive when extensions 
are made towards higher quality levels. That is, when a low image NB supplies PL with a 
higher image than the NB. For water category the effects are neutral, but in the chocolate 
category positive effects appeared. 
This study also contributes insights about the identity and disclosure of PL 
manufacturers. Olson (2012a) finds that a credible source that discloses a NB and PL as 
physically identical reduces perceptual gaps between them, mainly due to diminished 
attitudes and perceptions of the NB as unique, particularly if a leading NB supplies a PL 
recently introduced in the market. This study extends Olson’s work by considering another 
aspect of the situation, such that the NB is disclosed as the PL’s manufacturer on the PL 
package. It goes a step further by considering the moderating effects of PL and NB image. 
In this sense, the current study contributes to prior literature by empirically arguing and 
validating a moderating effect of the image of the NB and the image of the PL on the effects 
of disclosing suppliers on the PL packaging on the NB's brand equity. This moderation 
reveals that NBs will not always suffer damage to their brand equity when they supply PLs. 
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2.5.2. Practical implications 
For dual manufacturers, if high image NBs decide to supply PL for strategic reasons, 
such as using up excess capacity or improving the relationship with the retailer (ter Braak 
et al., 2013b), they should also consider the effects on their NB equity in choosing which 
retailer to supply. If it will disclose the manufacturer on the PL packaging, the manufacturer 
should seek a retailer partner that has a low image and PL that is less positioned toward 
price. If it is dealing with a retailer with a high PL and price positioning, it might suffer a 
loss in brand equity, which also could lead to possible cannibalization between the PL and 
the NB and harm the sales of its NB. 
We speculate that for cases in which the NB dominates the category (like cola); in terms 
of brand equity and sales, manufacturing the PL could not reduce the equity of such NB. In 
this case, the NB likely has little reason to supply the PL though, because if it already 
dominates the category, it should have less excess capacity and be little concerned about 
improving its relationship with the retailer (because consumers already demand the 
presence of the NB on retails shelves). Although there likely would be no detriment to NB 
equity, a priori there seem to be no reasons in favor of this manufacturing strategy. 
For less dominant NBs, which have suffered the most from the increasing share of PLs, 
manufacturing the PL might be nearly their only option to remain in the market. The 
advisable option would be to manufacture PL for retailers because such a strategy will not 
harm the brand and can provide improved performance while also absorbing excess 
capacity. Manufacturing for retailers with high PL images positioned on price may be 
beneficial in terms of accounting for surplus capacity, but this strategy evokes perceptions 
of the NB as more expensive, which eventually might harm sales of the NB. In this case, a 
better strategy might be to avoid dual manufacturing and instead specialize in PLs, or else 
use the returns from PL manufacturing to invest more in the NB to establish a strong brand 
that is clearly differentiated from the PL. 
Regarding retailers, they might prioritize dual manufacturers with high images to 
produce their PLs, to drive image transfers from the NBs to their PLs (Olson, 2012a). But 
a manufacturer with a high image NB likely has multiple options, so it might seek to 
manufacture the PL without being disclosed on the PL; if it is disclosed, it might opt for a 
retailer with a less inconsistent image relative to the NB. By forcing the manufacturer to 
disclose itself on the PL packaging, the retailer might miss an opportunity to improve its 
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PL, in that it discourages manufacturers with high brand images—who often have better 
innovation capacities and thus might supply better PLs to the retailer. 
A convenient way to encourage dual manufacturers with high image NBs to produce 
PLs could be to offer the manufacturer an exclusive supply relationship, that is, only the 
dual manufacturer will make PLs in one or more categories for the retailer’s shops. 
Moreover, offer the manufacturer the commitment to display its NBs and innovations on 
the retailer’s shelves could be a proper move to strengthen the relationship. This strategy 
assures the manufacturer an important increment of its sales, but the retailer could benefit 
of higher quality products and innovation insights (ter Braak et al., 2013b). 
Implications for consumers can also be made. Given that the disclosure of the PL 
manufacturer in the packaging affects the product evaluations by consumers, to include a 
label in the package with the supplier of the PL would be an extrinsic signal with useful 
information to consumers. Brands are a credible claim that enlightens product uncertainty 
(Erdem and Swait, 1998), so this supplier dislcosure may help consumers to infer product 
attributes. Moreover, the packaging is one of the elements that indirectly provides product 
attribute information (Erdem and Swait, 1998). Thus, that label allows consumers to 
compare and make inferences about NBs and PLs before to choose the brand that best suits 
their needs, reducing the perceived risk and speeding up their product evaluations. 
2.5.3. Limitations and future research 
This study is not exempt from limitations. The participants assessed two product 
categories and considered specific PL and NB products; analyses of other categories and 
brands would support greater generalization of the results. This study focuses mainly on 
the effects on brand equity from consumers’ perspective, but additional studies might 
address the effects on brand equity from a market or financial point of view. In addition, 
the analysis reflects the influence of PL supplier disclosure in the package at a particular 
moment in time. PL supplier disclosure has been a kept secret (Kumar and Steenkamp 
2007), however, in later years, retailers are more prone to disclose PL supplier and 
consumers have more tools (webpage, social networks) to know about PL manufacturers. 
Over time, the effects on brand equity could be accentuated, so further research should 
include the effects of manufacturing on brand equity over time. Moreover, this study 
doesn’t consider other contextual variables which could affect NB equity, like the 
similarity/dissimilarity of NB and PL packaging. Consumers will be prone to believe than 
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the PL is supplied by a NB when both products have similar packages. Therefore, further 
research could study the effect of disclosure considering copycat PL packaging strategy as 
another experimental condition (Kelting et al., 2017; Olson, 2012b). Also a more complex 
measure of loyalty could be used to capture different loyalty phase. This study measures 
loyalty using perceptual measures (loyalty intention), research could combine perceptual 
and behavioral data from panel data to analyze the effect over behavioral and loyalty 
intention. The PL included in this study is the tier most frequently used by retailers (i.e., 
standard), but it would be interesting to analyze other types of PL (e.g., economy, 
premium). Differences in price–quality positioning relative to the standard version could 
drive differential effects of manufacturer disclosure. 
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5.1. Leading conclusion 
Manufacturing collaboration between dual manufacturers and retailers is a strategy that 
is becoming more and more important these days. Either for manufacturers’ strategic 
reasons or to stay in the market, either for retailers to take advantage of image transfers or 
better quality for their PLs; dual manufacturing strategy will affect simultaneously all 
involved agents: consumers, manufacturers and retailers.  
According to the results discussed throughout previous chapters, the PL supplier 
disclosure will affect the brand equity, and this effect will be moderated by the image of 
both the NB and the PL. There will be a negative effect on perceived quality, image and 
loyalty intention of a high image NB if supplies a standard PL with high image. Though, 
these effects will disappear if the NB has a lower image. In the latter case, however, the 
NB will be perceived as more expensive by consumers, especially if the PL has a high 
image.  
The PL supplier might also affect the perceived image and relative price of the retailer. 
In this case, also moderated by the NB image and by the retailer’s image positioning. In 
such a way the retailer’s image perceived by consumers will be more positive the lower the 
retailer’s image positioning. Moreover, if the NB has a high image, then the retailer with a 
low image positioning will be perceived as more expensive.  
On the other hand, if we look at the PL type, the effects of the disclosure may vary 
depending whether it is a standard or a premium PL and the NB image. Thus, when a high 
image NB supplies a premium PL, the NB’s quality and image will improve, and the 
perceived quality and brand image differentials between NB and premium PL will increase. 
However, if we consider a standard PL, these differentials will be lower. 
In conclusion, we can affirm that disclosing the dual manufacturer strategy has 
implications for all the agents involved in the market. If we also consider the high PL 
penetration, especially in Western Europe (IRI, 2018), the vital importance of being aware 
about the consequences of this strategy becomes evident. In such way that manufacturers, 
retailers and consumers can act according to their interests.  
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5.2. Theoretical Implications 
Private label supplier disclosure usually has focused on the effects on PL's attitudes, 
perceptions and purchase intention, generally showing a positive effect for a PL with a 
standard positioning and/or not established in the long-term in the market (Cho et al., 2015; 
Fugate, 1986; Olson, 2010; Rahman and Soesilo, 2018; Steenkamp et al., 2010; 
Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal, 2000). But some of these previous works studied the effects 
on NBs’ overall attitudes too, finding opposing effects (Olson, 2012a; Rahman and Soesilo, 
2018; Steenkamp et al., 2010; Vaidyanathan and Aggarwal, 2000). 
Taking Olson’s (2012a) study as a basis, the results of the subsequent experiments 
conducted in previous chapters have several implications for PL supplier disclosure 
literature. Olson (2012a) found that if a credible source identifies a NB and a PL as 
physically identical, reduces perceptual gaps between them, mainly due to diminished 
attitudes and perceptions of the NB as unique, particularly if a leading NB supplies a PL 
recently introduced in the market. Moreover, he also found positive effects on the overall 
attitudes to the retailer due to the perceived supplier disclosure.  
 The present research, first extends Olson’s work by actually disclosing a NB as the 
supplier of a PL. Secondly, this study finds that the effects on brand equity of the PL 
supplier disclosure are moderated by both the NB and PL images. Which in turn, reveals 
that PL supplier disclosure has not always necessarily to harm the NB brand equity and, 
therefore, narrowing the differentials between NB and PL, contrasting with Olson´s 
findings. Thirdly, the results extend Olson´s positive effects on the retailer from a PL not 
familiar to consumers to a well-reputed PL and to the relative price perception of the 
retailer. Moreover, it was also observed a moderating effect both on the perceived retailer 
image and price perception by the NB image and the retailer´s image positioning. Finally, 
the results of this work extend the PL supplier disclosure literature by providing insights 
about premium PLs, which haven´t been previously addressed. 
Furthermore, this thesis also contributes to brand extension literature, confirming Heath 
et al.'s (2011) findings. Chapter 2 results show that brand extensions to lower quality levels 
(PLs) in the same category produce spillover effects on parent brand (high-image NB) from 
negative to neutral. However, if the extension goes to higher quality levels (low-image 
NB˗˗high-image PL), spillover effects go from neutral to positive. This thesis extends these 
findings to an extended brand owned by another company and to PL context. 
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5.3. Practical Implications  
The results of the present research have several implications for all the agents involved 
in the market, that is, manufacturers, retailers and consumers. 
5.3.1. Manufacturer implications 
Manufacturers can embrace a dual manufacturing strategy for strategic reasons like 
taking advantage of their excess capacity or improving the relationship with the retailer (ter 
Braak et al., 2013). However, they should be aware of the consequences of following this 
strategy for their NB’s perceptions. If a manufacturer with a high image NB decides to 
supply PLs for a retailer with a long-tradition, well-reputed PL brand, specially with a focus 
on price, the disclosure of the NB as the supplier on the PL packaging will lower the brand 
equity of the NB; and it can lead to a cannibalization between the NB and the PL that in the 
end can harm NB’s sales. This negative effects on the NB brand equity will disappear if the 
PL has a lower image or if the PL is a premium PL rather than a standard PL. Moreover, 
by being disclosed as the supplier of a premium PL, the NB can benefit of a transfer of the 
high image of the premium PL to the NB perceptions. 
In the case of lower image NBs, maybe supplying PLs can be their nearly option to 
remain in the market due to the push of PLs. The most beneficial decision for a lower image 
NB is supply a low image PL. In this way, the production of the PLs will absorb the 
manufacturer’s excess capacity and, at the same time, NB’s brand equity will not be 
harmed. However, if the PL has a higher image, the manufacturer still can use up the excess 
capacity, but the NB will be perceived as more expensive by consumers, which can lead to 
a loose in the NB’s sales. For these low image manufacturers, maybe become a 
manufacturer specialized in producing PLs will be a good option. On the other hand, these 
manufacturers could also take advantage of their profits to make a greater investment in 
their NB and differentiate it from the PLs. 
Therefore, manufacturers should choose wisely if they want to embrace a dual 
manufacturing strategy or not. In case they want, they should analyze which can be the best 
option available for their interests, a greater profit or a better perception for their NBs. 
5.3.2. Retailer implications 
Retailers may want to collaborate with dual manufacturers because of the benefits 
derived from that strategy. Partnering with a dual manufacturer with a leading, high image 
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NB, who often has more innovative capacities, can be a very positive signal about the 
quality of retailer’s own brands and also the retailer itself. On the other hand, a well-reputed 
retailer with a high image positioning will not benefit so much with PL supplier disclosure 
in terms of its own perceptions because there will be other factors, such as PLs quality, 
price positioning, product assortment, service, etc., that will play a greater role in 
determining the retailer’s perceived image by consumers. In the first case then, retailers 
with a lower image positioning, whose PLs often also have a lower image, can take a greater 
advantage of disclosing the supplier on PL packaging than high image retailers. Then, 
retailers with a lower image positioning will benefit of an improvement in their image 
perception when they disclose a high image NB as the PL supplier. However, this also can 
imply that consumers can perceive lower image retailers as more expensive.  
Regarding the effects on PLs, if dual manufacturers supply these brands, PLs can 
improve their perceptions, obtain innovative products or higher quality for premium PLs 
(Dunne and Narasimhan, 1999; ter Braak et al., 2013). By disclosing a high image NB as 
the supplier on their packaging, standard PLs can achieve better quality perceptions, even 
well-reputed standard PLs can.  
Therefore, retailers should be aware of the cost/benefit of collaborating with dual 
manufacturers to supply their PLs. The most interesting option for retailers can be 
collaborate with a manufacturer with a high image NB, because of the transfer of NB’s 
higher perceptions to retailer’s and PLs’ perceptions. However, consumers can perceive the 
retailer as more expensive. Thus, they have to evaluate if the higher perceptions would 
compensate for a possible loose of the more price sensitive consumers.  
5.3.3. Consumer implications 
Regarding the effects on consumers, supplier disclosure on PL packaging can be an 
external signal with which they can make inferences about product attributes and reduce 
the uncertainty and perceived risk about PLs. Depending on the images of both the NB and 
PLs and the retailer’s image, there will be image transfers of one another, leading to an 
actualization of consumers’ current perceptions about them. Thus, this strategy will allow 
consumers to compare between brands when purchasing products and speeding up product 
evaluations. While comparing, consumers, for example, can perceive they are paying more 
for a NB that has embraced a dual manufacturing strategy than another NB that decided not 
to do so. Consumers can even change their perceptions about the retailer itself, like a 
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dilution of advantageous price image of the retailer that has reached an agreement of 
collaboration with a dual manufacturer to provide the retailer’s PLs. 
5.4. Limitations and future research 
Throughout the previous chapters, this doctoral thesis has presented the results of 
different empirical studies, and for each of them the respective limitations have been 
detailed. In this section, we sum up the common limitations and discuss possible lines for 
future research derived from the results obtained. 
In all the studies, the PL supplier disclosure has been analyzed in different specific 
moments of time. Although dual manufacturing strategy has been kept as a secret in the 
past (Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007), in recent years retailers are more prone to disclose the 
supplier of their PLs, and consumers can now obtain such information on internet (e.g., 
consumer reports, forums, etc.). Study the disclosure effects through time can show if there 
is an incremental effect on brand equity. On the other hand, these studies do not consider 
other contextual variables like a copycat PL packaging in the supplier disclosure. Previous 
literature has shown that the copycat packaging strategy influence consumers’ perceptions 
(Kelting et al., 2017; Olson, 2012b) and then, can affect the PL supplier disclosure effects. 
Moreover, loyalty was measured with perceptual data using the variable “loyalty intention”. 
Using also behavioral data can add more generalization of the results by contrasting if there 
are differences between intentions and actual behavior. Finally, the two first studies 
(chapters 2 and 3) only analyzed standard PLs. Although in chapter 4 premium PLs were 
introduced in the analysis, the use of a student sample in that study means that caution is 
needed in interpreting the conclusions derived from the results obtained. 
As for future lines of research, apart from taking into account the limitations mentioned 
above, researching the PL supplier disclosure of hard discount retailers can be very 
interesting. Kumar and Steenkamp (2007) define these PLs as “value innovators”.  These 
value innovators are PLs that offer the best value option to consumers, with a functional 
quality paring with leading NBs but using meaningless own labels to demonstrate variety 
(Kumar and Steenkamp, 2007; Steenkamp and Sloot, 2019), thus consumers can have 
confusion to distinguish PLs from NBs. 
Another interesting line for future research can be analyzing the effects of the dissolution 
of PL supplying collaboration between dual manufacturers and retailers. In this thesis, we 
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have showed that brand equity of both NBs and PLs can be affected by disclosing a dual 
manufacturing strategy on PL’s packaging. In some cases, one or more brands benefited 
from disclosing the PL supplier. Nevertheless, we can wonder what would happen if, at 
some point, dual manufacturer and retailer decide to stop collaborating. In this scenario, 
the brand most benefited in terms of brand equity could experiment a drop in its perceptions 
by breaking the link with the brand that supported such strong associations. On the other 
hand, if the manufacturer had to make a huge investment in infrastructure for providing the 
retailer with PLs, now he should look for other ways to absorb the excess capacity or maybe 
sell that infrastructure that do not need anymore.  
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Appendix 1.3. Questionnaire 1 on mineral water category. SURVEY ITEMS 
(example on experimental condition 1) 
Part A Strongly disagree                                  Strongly agree 
I 
I know Font Vella brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The quality of Font Vella is very high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compared to other brands, Font Vella is more expensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Font Vella is a strong brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Font Vella is an attractive brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Font Vella is a unique brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Font Vella is a brand that I like 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The probability of buying Font Vella’s mineral bottled water 
is high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would recommend buying Font Vella’s mineral bottled 
water to other people 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part B Strongly disagree                                  Strongly agree 
I 
The quality of Hacendado is very high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compared to other brands, Hacendado is more expensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hacendado is a strong brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hacendado is an attractive brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hacendado is a unique brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hacendado is a brand that I like 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The probability of buying Hacendado’s mineral bottled 
water is high 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would recommend buying Hacendado’s mineral bottled 
water to other people 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part C Strongly disagree                                  Strongly agree 
I 
I know Mercadona stores 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compared with other stores, Mercadona is more expensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mercadona is a pleasant place to shop 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mercadona creates an attractive shopping experience 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mercadona has a good image 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mercadona offers a good overall service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The quality of the products in Mercadona is good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would recommend Mercadona to other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part D Strongly disagree                                  Strongly agree 
I 
I like to be informed by reading product labels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I buy mineral bottled water 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part E. Check the appropriate box in the case of “Sex”, indicate your Age and the approximate time it took to answer. 
Sex 
 
                Male                            Female  
Age 
 
    
Time to answer the questionnaire in minutes 
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Appendix 1.4. Questionnaire 1 on milk chocolate tablets category. SURVEY ITEMS 
(example on experimental condition 1) 
Part A Strongly disagree                                  Strongly agree 
I 
I know Nestlé brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The quality of Nestlé is very high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compared to other brands, Nestlé is more expensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nestlé is a strong brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nestlé is an attractive brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nestlé is a unique brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Nestlé is brand that I like 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The probability of buying Nestlé’s chocolate is high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would recommend buying Nestlé’s chocolate to other 
people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part B Strongly disagree                                  Strongly agree 
I 
The quality of Hacendado is very high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compared to other brands, Hacendado is more expensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hacendado is a strong brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hacendado is an attractive brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hacendado is a unique brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hacendado is a brand that I like 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The probability of buying Hacendado’s chocolate is high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would recommend buying Hacendado’s chocolate to other 
people 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part C Strongly disagree                                  Strongly agree 
I 
Compared with other stores, Mercadona is more expensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mercadona is a pleasant place to shop 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mercadona creates an attractive shopping experience 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mercadona has a good image 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mercadona offers a good overall service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The quality of the products in Mercadona is good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I consider myself a loyal customer at Mercadona 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part D Strongly disagree                                  Strongly agree 
I 
I like to be informed by reading product labels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I buy milk chocolate tablets 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part E. Check the appropriate box in the case of “Sex”, indicate your Age and the approximate time it took to answer. 
Sex 
 
                Male                            Female  
Age 
 
    
Time to answer the questionnaire in minutes 
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Appendix 2.2. Questionnaire 3 on crisps category. SURVEY ITEMS (example on 
experimental condition 1) 
Part A Strongly disagree                                  Strongly agree 
I 
I know Lay’s brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The quality of Lay’s is very high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compared to other brands, Lay’s is more expensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lay’s is a strong brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lay’s is an attractive brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lay’s is a unique brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Lay’s is a brand that I like 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The probability of buying Lay’s crisps is high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would recommend buying Lay’s crisps to other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part B Strongly disagree                                  Strongly agree 
I 
The quality of Hacendado is very high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compared to other brands, Hacendado is more expensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hacendado is a strong brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hacendado is an attractive brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hacendado is a unique brand 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Hacendado is a brand that I like 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The probability of buying Hacendado’s crisps is high 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would recommend buying Hacendado’s crisps to other 
people 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part C Strongly disagree                                  Strongly agree 
I 
I know Mercadona stores 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Compared with other stores, Mercadona is more expensive 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mercadona is a pleasant place to shop 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mercadona creates an attractive shopping experience 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mercadona has a good image 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
Mercadona offers a good overall service 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
The quality of the products in Mercadona is good 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I consider myself a loyal customer at Mercadona 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I would recommend Mercadona to other people 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part D Strongly disagree                                  Strongly agree 
I 
I like to be informed by reading product labels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I buy crisps 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
I buy private labels 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
 
Part E. Check the appropriate box in the case of “Sex”, indicate your Age and the approximate time it took to answer. 
Sex 
 
                Male                            Female  
Age 
 
    
Time to answer the questionnaire in minutes 
 



























   
 
 
  
